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ABSTRACT. In this paper we use results from the Hotelling model of non-renewable 
resources to examine the mainstream view among economists that improvements in 
recovery technology can offset declines in petroleum reserves. We present empirical 
evidence from two well-documented mega-oilfields: the Forties in the North Sea and the 
Yates in West Texas. Patterns of depletion in these two fields suggest that technology  
temporarily increases the rates of production at the expense of more pronounced rates of 
depletion in later years - in line with Hotelling’s predictions. Insofar as our results are 
generalizable, they call into question the view of most economists that technology can 
mitigate absolute resource scarcity. This raises concerns about the capacity of current 
mega-fields to meet future oil demand. 
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1. The economic view of resource scarcity 
  A recurring theme in resource economics textbooks is that absolute resource 
scarcity is not a major concern for economic policy. The standard view is that the price 
system, by encouraging substitution, exploration, and technological advances, in effect 
creates more resources as prices increase. In this view, scarcity is properly seen as an 
economic not a physical concept [1]. The view expressed in a recent text by Hanley, 
Shogren, and White [2] is typical:    
As a resource gets scarcer, its price will, other things being equal, tend to 
rise. This will reduce consumption (by substitution, for example), and 
increase production…What is more, as prices rise producers will be 
encouraged to engage in more exploration, which will increase the resource 
base if finds are made.  
  On the face of it, this argument is quite reasonable. However, it is one thing to 
accept the general statement that as a resource becomes scarce its price will rise and 
suppliers can profitably search for more of it and invest in technologies that boost 
production, but quite another to argue that the increasing scarcity of an essential resource 
like petroleum can be easily accommodated. The later position has been the basic 
message of resource economists for several decades now. The standard economic 
position is that scarcity is a relative, not absolute, concept and that there is nothing unique 
about any particular productive input, including petroleum.  
  Recent theoretical developments and empirical evidence suggests that economists 
may have been too quick to dismiss absolute scarcity. First of all it has become clear that 
the Walrasian general equilibrium model, upon which standard resource economics is   4 
based, depends on some strong assumptions that do not accurately describe real-world 
consumer or producer behavior [3], [4], [5], [6]. Theoretical economic models that 
address the issue of resource scarcity assume rational and fully informed agents, efficient 
allocation through time, and that present and future resource stocks are known. Secondly, 
the use of prices as indicators of absolute scarcity has been shown to be seriously 
misleading. Much of the empirical literature using historical prices to show that resources 
are not becoming scarce does not adhere to the same premises as the theoretical literature 
[7], [8]. Thirdly, the ceteris paribus assumption never holds so that we have to worry 
about a number complicating factors always present when dealing with non-renewable 
resources.  These include the Jevons effect that efficiency leads to lower prices and more 
consumption [9], the presence of historical lock-in of built infrastructure, and the political 
power of vested interests dependent upon continued exploitation of a particular resource 
[10], just to name a few. Finally, economists tend to see technology as a free good that 
depends only on human ingenuity, not physical constraints [11], [12], [13]. This 
technological optimism has been met with a great deal of criticism during the past few 
years. A number of physical scientists, as well as  a growing minority of economists, 
argue that this view overlooks the uniqueness and finiteness of oil resources.  
  In this paper we use a result of Hotelling [14] to examine the hypothesis that 
technology will mitigate the finiteness of petroleum reserves. Hotelling presented a 
formal analysis of non-renewable resources and derived some basic implications as to 
how technological investment in a finite resource affects the resource price, the extraction 
path, and the time until depletion.
1  Although the assumptions Hotelling used may have 
                                                 
1 Reserves are classified as proven, probable or possible. To be classified as “proven” the degree of 
certainty must be 90% [15].   5 
been unrealistic he was able to isolate the effect of each variable if the others are held 
constant. We use his basic model to analyze the production patterns of two mega oil 
fields: the Forties in the North Sea and the Yates field in Texas—fields that have applied 
advanced enhanced oil recovery (EOR) extraction technology—and examine the 
relationship between exhaustion rates and technological change. We find that the pattern 
of depletion in the Forties and Yates fields generally follows Hotelling’s predictions. Our 
results question the traditional economic view that technology  can easily overcome oil 
scarcity and they raise concerns about the capacity of current mega-fields to meet future 
oil demand. 
The next section presents the basic theoretical structure of the Hotelling model of 
non-renewable resources. The Forties and Yates oilfield case-study results are reported in 
the third section. A fourth section expands on one result of the Hotelling model: the case 
of an increase in demand. Finally, the last section presents the conclusions of our work. 
 
2. Hotelling revisited 
  It is only a small exaggeration to say that most contemporary resource economics 
is a footnote to Hotelling’s paper “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources.” [14]. 
Following Krautkraemer [16], the basic Hotelling equation can be written as: 
 
Maximize ∫ e
-δt[B(q(t),S(t)) – C(q(t), S(t))]dt                                                                 (1) 
subject to:     
 • 
 S(t)  =  -q(t), S(t) ≥ 0, q(t) ≥ 0, S(0) = S0                                                                        (2) 
   6 
where B[q(t), S(t)] represents gross benefits, C[q(t),S(t)] are the extraction costs; S is the 
remaining stock, δ is the rate of discount, and q(t) is the time path for resource extraction 
that maximizes the present value of the stream of net benefits from extraction. Notice that 
this key equation for resource policy only contains discounted monetary units. All 
information about the physical resource base comes through the price system.         
It can be seen from equation (1) that any new technology that lowers extraction 
costs, other things being equal, will increase the net present benefits of extraction. The 
effect of this on the resource price and the time path of extraction are shown in Figure 1. 
A technological improvement that reduces extraction costs (from C to C’) results in a 
lower resource price (the decline from P to P’) at the beginning of the time path of 
exhaustion and a steeper rise in price at the end, and it decreases the time left until 
exhaustion. We argue below that Figure 1 approximates what is actually happening in the 
representative oil fields we examined.    
  If Figure 1 is an accurate description of an exhaustible resource, then its 
exhaustion path will show a pattern depicted in Figure 2 below. Technological change 
increases production for a while but then the path to exhaustion becomes steeper.  
To the extent that technological advance increases present output at the expense of future 
output this implies that prices may be misleading indicators of future resource scarcity. 
Today’s lower prices may be the result of extracting more of the future’s resource supply. 
This is essentially the claim currently being made by a number of prominent energy 
researchers [17], [18], as well as popular writers on the subject of “peak oil” [19]. They 
argue that the approaching peak of world oil production is being masked by great 
improvements in extraction technology since the 1990s and that these technological   7 
improvements will make the decline steeper and the price rise more rapid in the years to 
come. This view is summarized by Zittel [20] in the conclusion to a study of North Sea 
oil production: 
This analysis shows how false it is to base our confidence on oil reserves 
being sufficient to maintain, let alone increase current production levels. 
Once the peak production of large fields is passed, the situation may switch 
very fast. According to our experience, individual oil companies are tempted 
to keep a high production rate as long as possible, instead of planning to 
smooth the future decline. Therefore, it might be feared that future decline 
will be the steeper, the longer the world’s oil companies try to hold high 
production levels. 
This is essentially the same point Hotelling made in his classic paper. Is there 
compelling empirical evidence supporting this point of view? 
 
3. Is Extraction Technology Masking Scarcity? Evidence from the North Sea and 
West Texas 
In this section we present the production paths that followed in the North Sea 
Forties and the West Texas Yates mega oilfields using historical production data reported 
by the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry and the Railroad Commission 
of Texas, respectively. We purposely focus on these two well-surveyed and well-
documented individual fields—rather than more aggregate examples—so as to 
acknowledge the strict scarcity of the resource, as assumed in Hotelling’s framework.    8 
The Forties and the Yates have been subject during their productive years to the 
application of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) technologies. EOR measures (also called 
secondary and tertiary measures) are often cited as a means of significantly increasing 
future recoverable reserves of oil by mobilizing resources and enhancing the recovery of 
oil and gas in place. EOR techniques include boosting extraction rates by better drainage 
of the oil in place: when the pressure in the oil field has decreased to a level where the 
viscosity of oil dominates the production profile leading to lower extraction rates, 
pressure can be raised artificially by water or gas injection, or by reducing the viscosity 
with the injection of steam or a chemical surfactant [21]. EOR technologies are widely 
used and do have the potential to enhance oil production. However, we present evidence 
that these measures increase the production rates only temporarily; apparently EOR 
reassures make it possible to extract the oil faster for a few years, but partially at least at 
the cost of steeper subsequent decline rates [22]. 
 
3.1. The North Sea Forties oilfield 
The Forties oilfield (named Forties after the sea area in which it lies) is the first 
and largest oilfield in the UK North Sea; it was discovered in 1970 and rapidly became 
the symbol of Britain’s North Sea oil boom. The time path of production in mega-fields 
such as this one shows a characteristic shape, slightly different from the classic bell-
shaped curve shown in Figure 2. Oil companies usually try to recover high initial 
investments as fast as possible by initially producing the fields at high rate. Production is 
normally capped at the maximum flow rate that can be kept given the pipeline system’s 
capacity and the technology in place, generating a plateau for a while. Eventually a   9 
decline in production occurs, driven by the decrease of pressure in the field and rising 
water levels.  
Figure 3 illustrates the historical production pattern of the Forties, and Table 1 
shows the change in annual production rates (extraction rates) for selected years. The 
field began production in 1975, and within three years, it reached a plateau at 500,000 
barrels per day. This plateau lasted for about three more years before the decline started 
in 1981. During the period 1981-1986 yearly production declined at an average rate of 
6.4 %  
In an attempt to boost production and recover production rates, in 1986 an 
additional (fifth) oil platform
2 was built, and EOR measures were implemented in 1987 
by injecting gas (CO2) into the reservoir. EOR measures and the additional platform did 
reduce the decline in production to about half of the previous average (from 6.4 to 3.5 
%). However, during the two following years, annual production dropped sharply, to an 
average rate of decline of 19.32 %. From then on, yearly production in the Forties 
declined at an average rate of 10.44 % (see Table 1). Technology arrested the decline in 
production for a year, from 1987 to 1988, but then the decline resumed at a rate steeper 
than before the additional investments in technology took place.  
Our analysis is constrained by the fact that there is no control case available to 
compare what the rates of depletion might have been without the application of EOR 
technology. Hence, it is impossible to determine precisely the contribution of EOR 
measures to the ultimate recovery of the field.  However, for offshore mega-fields like the 
Forties, plotting annual production versus cumulative production shows a characteristic 
                                                 
2 An oil platform is a large structure used to house workers and machinery needed to drill and then produce 
oil and natural gas in the ocean. Depending on the circumstances, the platform may be attached to the 
ocean floor, consist of an artificial island, or be floating.   10 
behavior: as soon as the plateau has passed, the production decline is almost linear. 
Hence, the extrapolation of that decline line to the x-axis permits a good estimate of the 
field’s ultimate recovery [23]. Figure 4 shows annual production in the Forties’ field as a 
function of cumulative production, with a straight decline trend after the plateau.  
This pattern implies that the additional platform and gas injection temporarily increased 
production without greatly affecting the field’s ultimate total recovery. The figure 
suggests that once the field reached its peak production level, EOR technology only 
slightly altered the path of depletion and the level of ultimate recovery, contradicting the 
widely promoted view that technology has the potential of increasing recoverable oil 
reserves enough to mitigate absolute scarcity.
3  
 
3.2. The West Texas Yates oilfield  
Another example of the effect of EOR measures occurred in the Yates oilfield  – 
US 7
th largest oilfield – located in Pecos County, West Texas. The historical pattern of 
production of the Yates is quite different from the pattern observed in the Forties’ (see 
Figure 5).  
The Yates field was discovered in 1926, and by 1927 reached a daily average 
production of 9,099 barrels of oil. The field showed an early production peak in 1929, 
with a production level of 41 million barrels of oil. Rates started to decline in 1930, and 
by 1941 had dropped to under six million barrels. Temporary measures such as 
observance of special rules with regards to water production in the fields allowed rates to 
increase again - reaching a new lower peak of 18 million barrels in 1948. After this year 
                                                 
3 A very similar pattern of production and depletion is found in another well-surveyed offshore mega-field: 
Prudhoe Bay, located in Alaska, United States. 
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however, the field experienced a continuous decline and the Railroad Commission of 
Texas allowed the injection of salt water and gas into producing formations. These early 
measures maintained pressure and retarded water encroachment, thus exposing a greater 
area of the reservoir to gravity drainage. By the year 1979, production in the Yates had 
more than doubled. 
In 1984, however, the field started to show signs of decline again, and rates of 
production decreased continuously during the following eight years. New EOR measures 
were implemented at that time in an attempt to recover, once again, extraction rates: 
reported is the application of water flooding, polymer injection and carbon dioxide 
flooding in 1993. These last attempts were successful for about 4 years, but in 1997 
production not only started to fall again, but it did so at rates much higher than the ones 
averaged in the period 1985-1993 [21].  
Figure 6 shows the production of the Yates field during the period 1984-2002, and 
Table 2 shows the average rates of depletion that the Yates field showed before and after 
the EOR technology was applied. By 2002 production rates were well below the ones 
reported prior to the implementation of the EOR measures. Again, investment in 
technology temporarily recovered production rates, but it did so at the expense of a 
steeper rate of decline in later years. 
 
4. Demand, royalties, and geopolitics: Hotelling once again  
  We have argued that the evidence indicates that technological change increases 
production for a while but then the path to exhaustion becomes steeper than it would have 
been without the new technology. Ceteris paribus, technological change increases   12 
resource supply and decreases the resource price for a while but results in sharply higher 
prices in later periods because the resource is exhausted faster than it would have been 
without the new technology. This implies that current prices are misleading indicators of 
future resource scarcity: today’s lower prices are the result of extracting more of the 
future’s resource supply. Furthermore, increasing demand for petroleum, as shown 
below, may complicate the worldwide situation. 
  The case of increased demand and enhanced recovery (resulting in a fall in 
production costs) can also be analyzed using Hotelling’s framework (see Figure 7).  
An improvement in recovery technology shifts the Hotelling price path downward and 
rotates it to the left. An increase in demand shifts the price path up and to the left. The 
combined effect on price is that EOR offsets the price effect of increased demand 
(partially or completely) but both effects reduce the time until resource exhaustion. In 
figure 6, EOR reduces the time to exhaustion from T to T’ and increased demand from T’ 
to T”. The implication of a possible sharp increase in demand for petroleum is that, even 
with the best technologies in place, we may face global oil exhaustion much sooner than 
what it is customarily anticipated.  
Because of the rapidly growing international demand for petroleum - much of it 
coming from the United States and Europe, but a rapidly increasing share from China, 
India, and other developing nations - the world's requirement for petroleum is projected 
to increase considerably. If Hotelling’s predictions follow, then the world may experience 
a much steeper rise in prices and the time of exhaustion may come sooner than expected. 
The case makes compelling the need for policies to encourage alternative sources of 
energy and conservation, and certainly the need of reconstructing a world economy   13 
whose political institutions and physical infrastructures are now based on the availability 
of cheap oil [24]. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Petroleum resources are not infinite on our planet and in the coming decades 
increasing pressure will be placed on the ability of oil to supply energy for the world’s 
growing economies. Technological progress has been posed as the major contributor in 
the coming years to the mobilization of new reserves and increasing the lifetime of 
present reserves. In this paper we examined this hypothesis and showed evidence from 
two well documented mega-oilfields - the Forties in the North Sea and the Yates in West 
Texas - that support the counter-argument that technology, rather than substantially 
increasing the lifetime of present reserves, may only mask increasing absolute scarcity, in 
accordance with Hotelling’s theoretical predictions. Technology does have the effect of 
increasing extraction initially and makes it possible to extract more of the petroleum in a 
given field, but it does so at the cost of increasing the rate of depletion – and decreasing 
the lifetime of the resource. Contrary to standard economic assumptions, temporary low 
prices may be misleading indicators of the ability of the economy to adjust to resource 
exhaustion. The Classical economists were aware of this but contemporary welfare 
economics has all but abandoned concern with real, physical production processes in 
favor of abstract models of exchange in an idealized purely mathematical framework.    
  If our results are generalizable they have serious implications for future world oil 
supply. If the pattern of depletion in the Forties and the Yates oilfields holds for the 
mega-fields in the Middle East this does not bode well for future petroleum supply and   14 
prices. Saudi Arabia - the world's leading oil producer – will soon face the peaking of its 
already mature giant fields. The case is made explicit by Simmons [15]: most of Saudi 
Arabia's oil output is generated by a few giant fields, of which Ghawar - the world's 
largest - is the most prolific. While the Yates and Forties fields at their peaks produced 
about 30 million barrels of oil a year, the Ghawar field has produced at at rate of 10 
million barrels per day.  The giant Saudi fields are aging (they were first developed 40 to 
50 years ago), and are already subject to EOR measures (water injection and other 
secondary measures) to maintain high levels of production and compensate for the drop 
in natural field pressure. If the pattern of exhaustion of these fields follows the ones 
shown in the Forties and Yates, then we can expect accelerated rates of depletion some 
time in the near future. In addition, as time goes on, the ratio of water to oil in these 
underground fields will rise to the point where further oil extraction will become difficult, 
if not impossible. According to Simmons [15] there is little reason to assume that future 
Saudi exploration will result in the discovery of new fields large enough to replace those 
now in decline.  
We have gathered and analyzed data for two of the three regions in the world that 
do actually publicly report historical production for individual fields - namely the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Norway. Individual oilfield estimates are confidential in 
most other countries, and are available only at great expense from commercial databases 
of variable quality [25]. Although results from two fields alone do not make by 
themselves a solid case that technology accelerates depletion, they should lead the way to 
a larger analysis. It is impossible to predict with any degree of reliability what the future 
rates of oil production are likely to be without first understanding field-by-field depletion   15 
rates [26]. It becomes critical then to develop and release reserve estimates, particularly 
for the mega-fields in Saudi Arabia, if we are to evaluate where the future of oil 
production, upon which the world’s economies now depend.  
Our study shows that details are important. It is not enough to say that technology 
will call forth substitutes as oil is exhausted. The critical question is how rapidly supplies 
are depleted and how rapidly quality substitutes can be made available at reasonable 
prices. EOR methods may just accelerate depletion of existing reserves OR they may 
accelerate depletion and capture significant additional reserves. In this paper we make a 
tentative case that, for two large fields at least, the first possibility was the case. What 
happens in other fields and for the industry as a whole depends critically on the physical 
characteristics of the fields and the nature of new technology. Can new technology 
improve the recovery rate significantly beyond the current 35% average? To our 
knowledge there is no technology now on the horizon that would do that. As we move 
down the depletion curve the energy return on energy invested (EROI) [27] will decrease. 
This is important since on the way up the peak EROI acts as a push and on the way down 
acts as a pull on the economic feasibility of recovery.  With its low extraction costs and 
flexibility petroleum is a unique source of energy far superior to any suggested 
alternatives. The “peak oil” debate has become polarized between those who say “there is 
nothing to worry about, technology will solve everything” and “we’re about to run out of 
oil and world’s economies will collapse.” Either one of these statements may be true and 
the realistic answer may not be in the middle. But the first step in gauging the 
implications of peak oil is to critically examine what has happened in the past and try to 
extrapolate the results to the future.         16 
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Fig. 1. Hotelling on technological change that lowers cost 
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Fig. 3. Historical pattern of production in the Forties oilfield (UK) 
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Fig. 4. Pattern of cumulative production of the Forties oilfield (UK) 



















































Fig. 5. Historical Pattern of Production of the Yates Oilfield  
Data Source: Railroad Commission of Texas 
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Table 1 














Selected Years  Average Change in 




3  % 
1975-1978  9.45  473.25 
1979-1980  0.84  0.29 
1981-1986  -1.60  -6.40 
1987  -0.69  -3.54 
1988-1989  -3.37  -19.32 
1990-2003  -0.70  -10.44   27 
 
Table 2  
Evolution of extraction rates in the Yates (Texas, USA) in selected years 
Selected Years  Change in 
Extraction per Year 
  10
6 Barrels per Year  % 
 
1991  -1.86  -8.49 
1992  -1.90  -9.51 
1993  -0.47  -2.60 
1994  1.27  7.21 
1995  0.96  5.07 
1996  0.24  1.20 
1997  0.42  2.11 
1998  -1.70  -8.29 
1999  -1.86  -22.95 
2000  -3.38  -23.30 
2001  -1.86  -29.20 
2002  -1.17  -14.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 